Theory of Moral Sentiments. By Adam Smith,

"HOW selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. That we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others is too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous and humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it.
This is an edition of a classical book first published in the eighteenth century.

„Cat de egoist ar putea fi presupus omul, exista in mod evident unele principii in natura sa, care il intereseaza pentru averea altora si ii fac fericirea necesara pentru el, desi el nu deriva nimic din ea decat placerea de a o vedea. felul este mila sau compasiune, emotia pe care o simtim pentru mizeria altora, atunci cand fie o vedem, fie suntem determinati sa o concepem intr-un mod foarte viu.